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Abstract: This paper explores how preferences for redistribution among voters are impacted by the 
structure of inequality. There are strong theoretical reasons to believe that some voter segments matter 
more than others, not least the so-called median-income voter, but surprisingly little attention has been 
paid to directly analysing distinct income groups’ redistributive preferences. In addition, while much of 
the previous literature has focused on broad levels of inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient, it 
is likely that individuals respond to different types of inequality in different ways. To rectify this gap, 
we use data from the European Social Survey and Eurostat to examine the interactive effect of income 
deciles and various measures of inequality. Results suggest that inequality especially affects the middle 
income groups – that is, the assumed median-income voters. Moreover, not all inequality matters 
equally: it is inequality vis-à-vis those around the 80th percentile that shapes redistributive preferences.  
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Are voters’ preferences for redistribution shaped by inequality? The interplay between national 
inequality levels and voter preferences is a major theme in comparative political economy beginning 
with the famed Meltzer-Richard (1981) model. In recent years a number of studies have explored 
whether the national level of inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient, affects voter preferences 
for redistribution (e.g., Lübker, 2007; Kenworthy and McCall, 2008; Dallinger, 2010; Schmidt-Catran, 
2016). Results are mixed, though the newest research generally finds that a high Gini coefficient is 
associated with relatively high support for redistribution.  
There are two reasons to be dissatisfied with the current state of the literature. First, scholars 
have rarely examined the redistributive preferences of specific income groups. On the one hand, much 
of the work centred around the redistributive preferences of specific groups only indirectly analyses 
them, focusing on redistributive outcomes rather than attitudes themselves (e.g. Milanovic, 2000; 
Kenworthy and Pontusson, 2005; Dallinger, 2015). Assuming non-trivial slippage between 
redistributive outcomes and preferences, which research suggests is almost certainly the case (e.g. 
Hacker and Pierson, 2011; Bonica et al., 2013; Matthijs, 2016), there are clear limitations to this 
approach. On the other, virtually all of the extant studies that directly analyse redistributive attitudes 
either look at aggregate preferences of the entire population (pooling the poor, the middle class, and the 
rich) or examine population subgroups (e.g. Kelly and Enns, 2010; Lupu and Pontusson, 2011; Luttig, 
2013; Page et al., 2013; Alt and Iversen 2017). This general failure to study the impact of redistributive 
preferences across the whole of the income spectrum means that we lack a systematic understanding of 
who is being affected by the structure of inequality: is it the (presumed powerful) median-income 
voters, the poor, or maybe even the well-off? 
Second and relatedly, existing research typically uses the Gini coefficient as the measure of 
inequality (e.g. Jæger, 2013; Rueda and Stegmueller, 2016; Steele, 2016). This is a good measure to 
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capture the overall level of national inequality, since the Gini coefficient indicates how much of 
society’s total earnings have to be redistributed to obtain perfect equality. It is not, however, suitable to 
ascertain whether and how the structure of inequality shapes popular preferences. Is it, for example, the 
distance to the bottom or the top of the income distribution that drives preferences, and do these effects 
vary across the income spectrum? Other measures exist that are much better at capturing the relative 
position of citizens vis-à-vis other income segments, yet they have rarely been employed.   
In the next section we outline different theoretical perspectives on how different income groups 
might be influenced by the structure of inequality, which we then test empirically in the remainder of 
the paper. We do so using inequality data from Eurostat combined with survey data from the last four 
rounds of the European Social Survey (2008-2014), focusing specifically on redistributive preferences. 
These surveys have carefully-parsed data on respondents’ income that allow us to compare income 
deciles reliably across countries. Our key findings are two-fold. First, it is the fifth and sixth income 
decile – what we label the median-voter segment – that appears to be affected by changes in inequality; 
neither the poor nor the rich are much affected by changing inequality in society, perhaps reflecting 
more stable baseline preferences at the bottom and top of the income distribution. Second, not all types 
of inequality matter equally for the median-voter segment: it is inequality vis-à-vis those around the 
80th percentile that shapes redistributive preferences. By contrast, we find that the distance to the poor 
does not affect median-voter segment preferences, and tentatively draw similar conclusions regarding 
the distance to the very rich. Our results, in sum, lend additional support to recent work corroborating 
the Meltzer-Richard model, but also hint at why the recent explosion of the incomes of the ultra-rich 
has not led to a greater electoral reaction. 
 
How inequality may affect voter preferences for redistribution 
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There are strong a priori reasons to suspect that the structure of inequality may matter for redistributive 
preferences. Assuming that voters do not simply respond to the existence of inequality as such, 
however, the key question is: what are the significant groups with which a voter compares herself? In 
other words, what is the yardstick of inequality that the voter uses to form opinions about the 
appropriate level of redistribution?  
There are a number of ways one might approach answering this question, but a natural entry 
point is provided by the literature focussed on analysing median voter preferences (see, for example, 
Iversen and Soskice, 2006; Lupu and Pontusson, 2011). Within this tradition, the two most basic 
yardsticks are the poor and the rich, which may be defined as those below and above the median 
income segment respectively. Taking this research field as our starting point, it is possible to deduce 
several expectations as to which income distances should matter and in what direction they should 
move the redistributive preferences of voters at the bottom, middle, and top of the income distribution. 
To that end, we now turn to laying out the various theories designed to explain median-voter 
preferences, given both their prominence in the literature and their potential broader applicability 
across the income spectrum, before briefly highlighting their application to other decile groups. 
 First, one might consider the distance to the poor, which may influence the median-income 
voter in two very different ways. According to the social rivalry theory proposed by Corneo and Grüner 
(2000), the median-income voter derives utility from living a life that she perceives as better than those 
at the bottom. This in turn implies that if the distance between the median-income voter and the poor 
decreases, the median-income voter’s utility drops because her lifestyle is now imitated by up-starts. 
The result is that a declining distance to the poor will lead to lower support for redistribution, since this 
becomes a means to keep the poor less well-off than the median-income voter. Conversely, if the 
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distance to the poor increases, the median-income voter has less to fear from the poor in this specific 
sense, and can therefore let other concerns influence her redistributive preferences.  
A similar set of expectations follows from work focusing on economic insecurity and support 
for welfare programmes (e.g. Cusack et al., 2006; Alt and Iversen, 2017). Here the central concept is 
insurance: individuals are expected to become more supportive of insurance against future income loss 
(i.e., via welfare programs) as their income increases, since unemployment becomes increasingly costly 
(see Moene and Wallerstein, 2001). This effect of course depends on the distribution of labour market 
risk, but in instances where risk is not entirely limited to low-income individuals, the result will be a 
broader base of pro-redistribution support (Rehm et al., 2012). For our purposes, this suggests – just as 
under Corneo and Grüner’s (2000) social rivalry theory – that as the distance between the median voter 
and the bottom increases (decreases), the median voter will feel that she has more to gain (lose) from 
redistribution. Regardless of the underlying mechanism, empirical results from Tóth and Keller (2013), 
who carry out the closest study to our own (albeit with only a subset of the inequality measures we 
examine), provide support for this interpretation. 
The social affinity perspective, by contrast, predicts that the distance between the median-
income voter and the poor will have exactly the opposite effect (Lupu and Pontusson, 2011). From this 
perspective, a key component of support for redistribution is a shared sense of fate between middle- 
and low-income groups. Numerous factors of course shape the likelihood of social affinity – not least 
ethnic and racial heterogeneity (e.g. Soroka et al., 2016). Crucially, however, inequality plays a central 
role, driven by two potential mechanisms (Lupu and Pontusson, 2011: 318): first, high inequality is 
associated with lower levels of social mobility (e.g. Andrews and Leigh, 2009), making it less likely 
that middle-income individuals will fear dropping into the lower classes; and second, higher inequality 
decreases the likelihood of having interactions with the poor, since it increases social and geographic 
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segregation (e.g. Fischer et al., 2004). As a consequence, increases in the distance between middle- and 
low-income groups should result in lower levels of support for redistribution.  
 At the same time, the distance to the top may also affect median-income voter preferences. The 
most well-known argument in this line of research is proposed by Meltzer and Richard (1981), who 
were themselves building on earlier work by Romer (1975). Meltzer and Richard theorize that the 
greater the distance between median and mean income, the more supportive of redistribution the 
median-income voter (and, indeed, all voters with a below-the-mean income) will become. The motive 
here is pure self-interest. When the distance between the median and mean income is large, there is a 
lot of money to be gained from redistribution. In contrast, when the distance between the median and 
mean is low, there is comparably less to be won, and redistributive preferences should accordingly be 
weaker. The Meltzer-Richard model assumes that as long as there is anything to be gained, the median-
income voter will support redistribution – an assumption that may help to explain why many 
researchers have found limited support for the model (e.g. Moene and Wallerstein, 2001; Bradley et al., 
2003; Kenworthy and McCall, 2008; Barth et al., 2015).  
Part of the issue here may be that the Meltzer-Richard model cannot tell us if it is the distance 
to certain segments that matters. This is relevant because the distance to the top may mean at least two 
different things. The relevant distance could, for one thing, be that to the very affluent – for example to 
the top 5% in society. This could be called the “soak the rich” thesis. Yet, most people know very little 
about the lifestyles enjoyed by many CEOs, as evidenced by their striking underestimation of CEO 
remuneration levels (McCall and Chin, 2013). In the formulation of Shapiro (2002: 121), “[w]orkers do 
not compare themselves to their bosses in assessing their circumstances. They do not compare 
themselves to the rich, but rather to workers like themselves.” This alternative view could be called the 
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“envy your brother” thesis and implies that it is the distance to income groups much closer to the 
median-income voter that matters.  
 No matter the exact yardstick used by the median-income voter to assess the distance to the top, 
so far the expectation has been that a greater distance should lead to more support for redistribution. 
Yet, given that many of the more unequal democracies, such as the US, redistribute relatively little, 
some scholars have argued in favour of the opposite relationship (Benabou, 2000; Rodríguez, 2004; 
Trump, 2017). Contra the Meltzer-Richard model, Benabou (2000) and Rodríguez (2004) suggest that 
as inequality rises, people in fact become less pro-redistribution, since their potential gain from 
redistribution in fact decreases rather than increases. Key here is the focus on de facto gains: for 
Benabou (2000), whenever redistribution generates real or perceived improvements of overall welfare 
in society, increases in inequality will lead fewer individuals to find that the welfare-enhancing effects 
of redistribution outweigh their income losses via taxation; while for Rodríguez (2004), voters perceive 
that greater inequality increases the political influence of the rich, and thus assume that redistributive 
expenditure will disproportionately benefit the well-off, at least vis-à-vis middle-income groups. 
Trump (2017), in turn, finds evidence to suggest that growing inequality might lead citizens to be 
increasingly accepting of large income differences, thanks to a psychological tendency toward 
legitimizing the social system in which one lives. Regardless of the mechanism, this perspective 
suggests that inequality will tend to reinforce itself over time, as inequality breeds anti-redistributive 
attitudes – a proposition that has found empirical support in several studies of overall public 
preferences in the US (Kelly and Enns, 2010; Luttig, 2013). We combine these explanations into the 
“conservative acceptance” thesis, since they all lead to the expectation that voters will accept more 
fiscally conservative policies as the distance to the top grows. 
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 Although many of the above theories were devised with reference to the median-income voter, 
these mechanisms should work for other income segments as well – all that is required is a relevant 
group with which an individual can compare herself. For instance, the social rivalry theory is likely less 
relevant for those at the very bottom of the income distribution, but it could be central to explaining 
preferences of the well-off. In contrast, the poor could be motivated to both “soak the rich” and “envy 
your brother”, whereas the relevance of these theories is less obvious for the well-off (though all 
groups are of course quite heterogeneous, a fact we explicitly deal with below). The remainder of the 
paper is meant to explore these ideas.  
 
Data 
To carry out our analysis, we use data from four waves of the European Social Survey (ESS), with 22 
countries included in the overall sample. In particular, we focus on the 2008-2014 rounds, since these 
surveys contain a standardized question asking respondents to place themselves within their 
corresponding income decile.1 The number of survey respondents ultimately included in the analysis 
totals 106,003, with the number of observations in a given country-wave ranging from 509 (Italy in 
2010) to 2609 (Germany in 2014). The vast majority of countries in the sample (15 out of 22) are 
included in all four rounds, while only two (Israel and Italy) have data for but a single round. Appendix 
Table 1 lays out further details on the distribution of respondents across the countries and waves. 
Given that our focus is on attitudes toward redistribution, we use a belief that the government 
should reduce inequality as our dependent variable. To that end, we look at responses to the question 
“The government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels” with responses on a 
                                               
1 In prior rounds, respondents were instead asked to sort themselves into one of 12 potential income brackets, with 
categories that did not reflect the actual spread of incomes within a country and were not standardised across countries.  
9 
 
five-point scale (recoded from zero to one) ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”. The 
distribution of responses leans considerably toward agreement: about 70 per cent of respondents either 
agree or strongly agree (with a mean of 0.70 and a standard deviation of 0.26 in the sample).  
The key explanatory variable in the analysis is the interaction between inequality and income 
quintile, specifically at the middle-income group. As discussed above, we incorporate a variety of 
inequality measures in order to explore the importance of the structure of inequality. By way of a first 
glance at the broad relationship here, Figure 1 compares mean levels of preferences for redistribution 
against Gini coefficients.2 Each observation on the graph represents a country-year, and we include an 
ordinary least squares regression line as a preliminary indicator. The plot reveals considerable variation 
not only in levels of inequality, but also in mean attitudes toward redistribution – ranging from 0.49 (in 
Denmark, 2014) to 0.85 (in Hungary, 2010). Overall, the simple bivariate relationship suggests that 
higher levels of inequality are correlated with a modest increase in preferences for redistribution. At 
this basic level, then, the data point toward a positive impact of inequality writ large on aggregate 
preferences for redistribution (though see our discussion of endogeneity below).   
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
Our key goal here, however, is to disaggregate both income groups and the effects of different 
types of inequality, thereby permitting us to examine how the structure of inequality impacts different 
income groups.  We examine five inequality ratios that reflect our hypotheses: 50:5, 50:20, 80:50, 
                                               
2 Gini inequality data from Eurostat. 
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95:50, and 90:10.3 These measures indicate the distance between two percentile points, where lower 
percentiles are associated with lower income levels. The 50:20 ratio, for instance, tells us how many 
times higher the net income of the fiftieth percentile (i.e., the percentile that exactly cuts the income 
distribution in two) is compared to the twentieth percentile. A 50:20 ratio of two indicates that those at 
the fiftieth percentile make twice as much income after taxes and transfers than those at the twentieth 
percentile. Similarly, the 95:50 ratio tells us how many times more income the ninety fifth percentile 
takes home compared to the fiftieth.  
All of our inequality measures use post-tax and transfer household income as their base, since 
high-quality data of this sort are much more readily available than those on market income. Most 
potential measures of market inequality either lack enough respondents to provide a reliable measure of 
inequality (e.g. ESS data) or would force us to exclude various countries and survey waves from the 
analysis (e.g. LIS data). Eurostat, by contrast, has comparable alternative data to those we are using – 
but that measure of income distribution is only pre-social transfer (save for pensions), not pre-taxes.  
These gains in data quality are, however, accompanied by two principal drawbacks. First, the 
use of post-tax and transfer inequality data prevents us from performing a strict test of Meltzer and 
Richard (1981), which places market inequality at its core. Yet, while it is certainly true that the 
Meltzer-Richard model assumes that people care about market inequality, the intuition behind this 
assumption is questionable. There are strong a priori reasons to believe that disposable income – not 
market income – is what drives preference for more or less redistribution: post-tax and transfer 
inequality is the inequality that individuals actually experience in society, and insofar as people care 
                                               
3 We then performed robustness checks where necessary to ensure that results were not simply artefacts of a particular 
percentile ratio, confirming that nearby ratios did not return wholly different results.   
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about the ability to maintain a specific lifestyle (compared to relevant other groups) disposable income 
should thus matter much more than market income. 
Second and more fundamentally, the use of post-tax and transfer data also introduces issues of 
endogeneity to the model. When asked about their desire for government action to reduce income 
differences, at least some survey respondents are liable to take into account the current level of actually 
existing inequality. Although there is considerable debate as to the scope of public responsiveness (see 
Druckman, 2014) and even the direction such an effect might take (cf. Soroka and Wlezien, 2010; 
Trump, 2017), it seems almost certain that some effect would be present. Cross-sectional survey 
analysis is ill-suited to settle these kinds of causality issues, but several considerations help to mitigate 
these concerns. On the one hand, as Schmidt-Catran (2014: 127-128) argues, previous research 
suggests that the supposed impact of using post- versus pre-tax and transfer inequality data is perhaps 
overstated: studies suggest that that pre- and post-tax and transfer inequality ratios are in fact quite 
highly correlated (e.g. Milanovic, 2000: 390; Finseraas, 2009: 101), and the empirical consequences 
should thus be rather limited. On the other, it is unclear why this sort of endogeneity would 
differentially affect the various income groups and inequality ratios under investigation here. As a 
consequence, we can be reasonably certain that our findings are not simply the result of our using post-
tax and transfer data. 
With that in mind, we calculate our inequality measures using data from the European Union 
Statistics on Income and Living Standards, which is collected by Eurostat via surveys and made 
comparable using purchasing power standard. The data provide percentile values for each of the 
countries. While this survey approach to formulating inequality ratios may in some cases be prone to 
errors on the part of respondents, the dataset has the virtue of allowing us to specify the structure of 
inequality in detail. Nevertheless, we attempt to circumscribe potential problems by remaining cautious 
12 
 
about data related to the poles of the income distribution, since the quality and comparability of the 
data across countries becomes more suspect. This leads us to avoid anchoring inequality ratios on 
extreme values, such as the 1st and 99th percentile  – partly due to difficulties including such individuals 
in a survey sample, but also because of measurement issues related to capital investments.4 
The measure of respondent income decile, in turn, comes from a question in the ESS asking 
respondents to indicate their net household income (from all sources) within a range of values. Decile 
brackets were pre-calculated for each specific country-wave on the basis of the actual distribution of 
income preceding the survey. The distribution of decile brackets broadly reflects this construction, even 
after the loss of observations with missing data, with a mean decile value of 5.4 and a standard 
deviation of 2.8. In the final sample, most of the brackets roughly correspond to 10 per cent of the 
observations, as we would expect, with the fifth decile the largest group (at 11.1 per cent). And while 
there is some variation across countries, only in Israel does any group surpass 20 per cent (with 22 per 
cent of respondents in the first income decile). To address any potential issues on this front, we 
therefore confirm below that our results are unaffected by the inclusion of Israeli respondents.  
Controls are chosen based on the standard approaches in existing research (see, for example, 
Cusack et al., 2006; Finseraas, 2009), so we only delineate them here briefly. At the individual level, 
we include standard control variables for: good/very good self-assessed health status (measured as a 
dummy), since poor health has been found to have a positive effect on welfare state support (e.g. Jæger, 
2006); self-placement on the left-right scale (on an 11-point scale, coded from 0 to 1); gender (males 
coded as 1), since previous research suggests females are generally more supportive of redistribution; 
                                               
4 In brief, non-wage losses – most notably related to capital investments – leads to negative recorded income in some 
instances (for further discussion of the issue, see Eurostat, 2010: 17-18). As a result, the values at the 1st percentile vary far 
more dramatically between countries than those of other inequality ratios (ranging from 3.2 to 61.6 once we remove 
negative values). 
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age, with older individuals typically more supportive of redistribution; education level (using the five-
category harmonised ISCED-97 scheme), since those with more education may be less precariously 
positioned in the labour market; dummy variables for employment and unemployment; and a dummy 
variable for survey wave. Finally, at the national-level, we include an economic control for (centred) 
GDP per capita, calculated with purchasing power parity. In line with recent work (Schmidt-Catran, 
2016), we explicitly limit the number of country-level controls given limitations related both to degrees 
of freedom and high collinearity, instead building to a random-slopes model that allows us to control 
for unobserved variance that might impact the effect of our key variables.  
While the individual-level data of course comes directly from the ESS, the national-level data is 
taken from the OECD.5 Note that variance inflation factor scores confirm that multicollinearity is quite 
low, both at the individual- and national-level, with all values below four (see O’Brien, 2007). 
Appendix Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for all variables incorporated in the analysis below. 
 
Analysis  
We carry out our analysis by constructing a series of hierarchical models (using maximum likelihood 
estimation) for each of our inequality ratios. In every instance, 106,003 respondents are nested within 
76 country-year clusters, which are themselves nested within 22 country clusters. We employ this 
three-level approach (combined with survey wave dummies) as it has been shown to produce more 
accurate (i.e. conservative) results than the commonly-employed alternatives (see Schmidt-Catran and 
Fairbrother, 2016); as a result, we can be more confident in the robustness of our findings, which is 
especially important given the exploratory nature of our analysis. We then present our key results in a 
step-wise fashion, first allowing only the intercepts to vary and then incorporating random slopes (as a 
                                               
5 Namely, the OECD’s National Accounts Statistics, Labour, and Social Protection dataset. 
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stricter test of our hypothesis). With this final step, we allow the effect of income decile to vary by 
country in order to compensate for unobserved country-level factors.  
Using this approach, we ran separate models for each of our five inequality ratios and analysed 
their respective interaction effect with each of the income decile groups. Results (relegated to the 
Online Appendix) suggest that most forms of inequality have little impact on redistributive preferences, 
and that this is the case for the poor and rich alike. Although we examined effects across the income 
spectrum, it is only in the middle of the income distribution – typically the fifth and sixth deciles – that 
one finds any robust effects, perhaps reflecting more stable baseline preferences among lower- and 
upper-income groups. Regardless of the reasons for this non-finding, these results lead us to focus the 
remainder of our analyses on the 5th and 6th income deciles.  
In addition to these differences across income groups, we also find variation based on the 
structure of inequality, suggesting that not all types of inequality matter equally. These findings 
indicate that the distance between the middle and bottom income groups does not appear to shape 
redistributive attitudes, as the interaction consistently fails to reach statistical significance. This is the 
case not only for the large distance captured by the 50:5 inequality ratio, but also when we focus on 
income groups that are closer to the middle (e.g. using the 50:20 ratio). Since the distance from the 
middle to lower income groups appears to have no effect either way, we find no support for the Social 
Rivalry, Insurance, or Social Affinity hypotheses. Instead, it is the distance to higher income groups that 
seem to matter, and in particular the distance to those that are closer to the middle: it is the 80:50 
inequality ratio, rather than the 95:50 ratio, that appears to shape the preferences of middle-income 
groups.6 Results, as we lay out below, are robust to a variety of additional tests. This leads us to 
                                               
6 To test for the possibility that the 80:50 ratio was anomalous and that the results were artefactual, we confirmed that 
similar inequality ratios (e.g. 75:50, 85:50) returned similar results. 
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therefore tentatively find greater support for the Envy your Brother hypothesis over the Soak the Rich 
hypothesis.  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Table 1 presents our key findings in a step-wise fashion, homing in on the model featuring 
80:50 inequality ratios: Model 0, the null model, is presented as a baseline; Model 1 adds the 
individual-level variables along with the survey wave dummies; Model 2 adds the inequality measure; 
Model 3 is the full (random-intercepts) model; and Model 4 incorporates random slopes for income 
deciles, both at the country and country-year level. We take this step-wise approach as a robustness 
check, as it provides us some assurance that the results of the full model are not simply driven by a 
specific aspect of the model construction. The corresponding estimated variances are then included at 
the bottom of each column.  
Results across the models are overall quite consistent. Addressing the control variables first, the 
standard individual-level variables have the expected effects. Youth, higher education levels, and right-
wing self-placement are all associated with lower preferences for redistribution, as is being male and 
being in good health. Relative to those not in the labour market, unemployed persons are notably more 
likely to support redistribution, while employed persons are marginally more likely. At the national 
level, the positive effect of GDP nears significance, which is not a trivial result given the relatively 
limited number of countries in our sample.  
Most importantly, we find that higher 80:50 inequality ratios are associated with increased 
preferences for redistribution among middle-income groups – specifically among the fifth and sixth 
deciles, though this only becomes clear once we incorporate the standard robustness checks. Since we 
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are interested in an interaction effect, the key results in Table 1 should be read carefully: coefficients 
for the direct and interaction effects between inequality and decile grouping are relative not only to one 
another, but also to the fifth income decile, which we set as the baseline group given the apparent 
importance of the middle-income groups in this analysis. This makes it very difficult to assess specific 
findings in isolation. To address this complexity, Figure 2 presents the average marginal effects of the 
80:50 inequality ratio across the income decile groups. The top panel presents the results from the 
random-intercepts only model (Model 4) while the bottom illustrates the effect once we allow the effect 
of income deciles to vary across countries and country-years (Model 5).  
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
Turning first to the top panel of Figure 2, initial results suggest that it is among the fifth, sixth, 
and seventh decile groups that the 80:50 inequality ratio appears to make a difference. These findings 
indicate that, for these groups, moving from the lowest to the highest inequality country would be 
associated with an increased preference for redistribution of about 0.09. This is a greater difference 
than that found across the interquartile range of country-mean redistributive preferences – i.e., 
comparing the mean response in the Czech Republic (at 0.67) to that in Finland (at 0.74). And while 
increases related to the 80:50 inequality ratio could only account for a limited portion of overall 
variation (with responses to the question ranging from 0 to 1 and exhibiting a standard deviation of 
0.26), the effect is larger than those correlated with standard variables in the literature, such as 
unemployment (at slightly under 0.03), being in good health (at 0.01), and education (at 0.04 across the 
full range of levels). Age and ideology are the only control variables that might potentially have a 
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larger effect – but even with them moving across the inter-quartile ranges is correlated with shifts of 
0.03 and 0.08 respectively.  
While at first these effects appear to extend from the fifth through to the seventh decile, 
additional analysis confirms that they are robust only for the fifth and sixth decile. The standard 
robustness checks were carried out in four stages (with the effect of the 80:50 inequality ratio on the 
seventh frequently failing to reach significance). First, in the bottom panel of Figure 2, we noted 
similar results when we allowed the effect of income deciles to differ across countries and country-
years (using random slopes). As discussed above, this provides some safeguard that unaccounted for 
heterogeneity is not driving our main effects. Second, we confirmed that the results are robust to 
various alterations to the model specification: we do so, most notably, by changing the variables 
included in the model7 and removing Israel from the sample (given the atypically high imbalance in the 
distribution of respondents across the income distribution). Third, we reran the analysis using country 
robust standard errors, finding that the effects only remain significant for the fifth and sixth decile 
groups (see Appendix Figure 1). Finally, we re-ran the model 22 times, excluding one country at a time 
(i.e. remove-one jackknife) to confirm that our results are not driven entirely by a single case. Here 
again, the interaction effects are only consistent for the fifth and sixth decile groups; with largely 
equivalent, though slightly larger coefficients, their p-values both remain below 0.1 (see Appendix 
Figure 2).  
                                               
7 We tested an extended individual-level set of variables pointed to in the literature: household size (centred for 
computational reasons to facilitate convergence), since larger households require household income to be stretched further; 
union membership, as some research suggests union members are more predisposed toward redistribution; church 
attendance (on a 7-point scale), which may decrease support for redistribution; attitudes toward immigrants (on an 11-point 
scale), given the possible prevalence of welfare chauvinism and/or the notion that immigrants are the prime recipients of 
redistribution; and self-identification as a minority, which has implications both regarding general levels of precarity 
(thereby potentially increasing support for redistribution) and the above question on attitudes toward immigrants. In 
addition, we also excluded ideology from the models due to the possibility of post-treatment bias.  
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Overall, the results demonstrate that the structure of inequality is worthy of detailed attention. 
Although many scholars have debated whether higher levels of general inequality, as measured by the 
Gini coefficient, are associated with increased median-voter preferences for redistribution, this 
discussion can only take us so far. Looking at a wide variety of inequality ratios, we find that: (1) the 
structure of inequality only has a robust effect on middle-income groups – specifically the fifth and 
sixth decile groups; and (2) it is only one specific type of inequality that appears to matter – that 
between middle income groups and those around the 80th percentile. This leads us to tentatively find 
greater support for the Envy your Brother hypothesis over the Soak the Rich hypothesis. Nevertheless, 
we cannot rule out a potential effect of data quality issues at the extreme ends of the income 
distribution, and this distinction therefore clearly warrants further research.    
 
Conclusion 
In this paper, we have explored how the structure of inequality affects the redistributive preferences of 
citizens across the income distribution. Somewhat unexpectedly, much of the action in fact related to 
the politically interesting median-income group: although we examined the determinants of preferences 
across the income distribution, the empirical results suggest that it is only within the middle-income 
groups that the structure of inequality has an effect. For all decile groups but the 5th and the 6th, we 
found no robust effects of inequality. 
Given that the median-income voter is often thought to wield a lot of influence over who gets 
elected and what social policies are pursued (e.g. Iversen and Soskice, 2006; Tepe and Vanhuysse, 
2009; Jensen, 2012), our findings speak to a broad body of literature. Contrary to theories based on the 
Social Rivalry, Insurance, or Social Affinity hypotheses, as well as the findings of Tóth and Keller 
(2013), the distance to the bottom does not affect the median income groups’ preferences for 
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redistribution. What matters for the median-income segment is the distance to those with more 
resources than themselves. In particular, it is the distance to what one might think of as the “upper-
middle class” – the well-off-but-not-rich – that is associated with greater median-income segment 
support for redistribution. Although individuals often have a difficult time assessing the overall extent 
of inequality in their societies (e.g. Kenworthy and McCall, 2008; Norton and Ariely, 2011; McCall, 
2013), this appears to be one form of inequality that bucks the trend. 
The interpretation of the relationship appears reasonably straightforward: the inequality 
between the median-income segment and those around the 80th percentile is highly visible for members 
of the median-income segment because of the comparably similar lifestyles that the two groups tend to 
live. More research will be needed to assess the mechanisms underlying this relationship, however, as 
the present study does not allow us to examine how middle-income groups become aware of increased 
inequality. Studies on the consequences of geographic proximity and/or shared workplaces would be 
particularly valuable in this regard. Relatedly, the potential effect of class distinctions between the 50th 
and 80th percentiles is also of interest: an investigation into the consequences of middle- versus upper-
middle class markers therefore offers another route forward. Middle-class attitudes toward the upper-
middle class may differ in crucial ways from those toward the very rich, in particular as they relate to 
hopes of upward social mobility.  
 In addition, the present study is also unable to ascertain whether middle-income group 
preferences for redistribution are primarily self-serving (with an interest only in redistribution toward 
the middle class) or also contain a substantial other-regarding component (perhaps due to a concern 
with inequality per se). Future work with thus especially benefit from survey data that disaggregates 
redistributive preferences along self- and other-oriented dimensions (see Cavaille and Trump, 2015). 
And while we can say fairly confidently that the distance between the median income segment and the 
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bottom does not matter and that the distance to the top does, we are less certain that it really is the 
distance to the upper middle class rather than the rich that matters. Although the 80:50 model points to 
the most robust effect of inequality on middle-income attitudes, it remains difficult to confidently 
capture data on the very highest incomes. The statistical results presented here should therefore be 
supplemented with additional studies in the future in order to reach a firmer conclusion on this point. In 
particular, we envision that more focused surveys, perhaps including survey experiments, might be able 
to more precisely inform us about the yardsticks of inequality used when forming opinions about 
redistribution.  
More broadly, our results should be read in conjuncture with research on the relationship 
between class differences and redistributive preferences (e.g. Svallfors, 2006; Kumlin and Svallfors, 
2007; Edlund and Lindh, 2015). We therefore believe that future research that exports the analytical 
framework presented here to issues of class relations and class identities would be particularly fruitful 
for assessing the effects of the structure of inequality on redistributive preferences.  
 
 
21 
 
Works Cited 
Alt, J., and Iversen, T. (2017). 'Inequality, labor market segmentation, and preferences for 
redistribution', American Journal of Political Science 61(1): 21-36. 
Andrews, D., and Leigh, A. (2009). 'More inequality, less social mobility', Applied Economics Letters 
16(15): 1489-1492. 
Barth, E., Finseraas, H. and Moene, K.O. (2015) 'Political reinforcement: how rising inequality curbs 
manifested welfare generosity', American Journal of Political Science 59(3): 565-577. 
Benabou, R. (2000) 'Unequal societies: Income distribution and the social contract', American 
Economic Review 90(1): 96-129. 
Bonica, A., McCarty, N., Poole, K.T. and Rosenthal, H. (2013) 'Why Hasn't Democracy Slowed Rising 
Inequality?', The Journal of Economic Perspectives 27(3): 103-123. 
Bradley, D., Huber, E., Moller, S., Nielsen, F. and Stephens, J.D. (2003) 'Distribution and 
Redistribution in Postindustrial Democracies', World Politics 55(2): 193-228. 
Cavaillé, C. and Trump, K.-S. (2015) 'The two facets of social policy preferences', The Journal of 
Politics 77(1): 146-160. 
Corneo, G. and Grüner, H.P. (2000) 'Social limits to redistribution', American Economic Review 90(5): 
1491-1507. 
Cusack, T., Iversen, T. and Rehm, P. (2006) 'Risks at work: The demand and supply sides of 
government redistribution', Oxford Review of Economic Policy 22(3): 365-389. 
Dallinger, U. (2010) 'Public support for redistribution: what explains cross-national differences?', 
Journal of European Social Policy 20(4): 333-349. 
Dallinger, U. (2015) 'Public Redistribution and Voter Demand: The Role of the Middle Class', 
comparative sociology 14(6): 721-750. 
22 
 
Druckman, J. N. (2014) 'Pathologies of studying public opinion, political communication, and 
democratic responsiveness', Political Communication, 31(3): 467-492.  
Edlund, J., and Lindh, A. (2015). 'The democratic class struggle revisited: The welfare state, social 
cohesion and political conflict', Acta Sociologica, 58(4): 311-328. 
Eurostat. (2010) An assessment of survey errors in EU-SILC, Luxembourg: Eurostat Publications 
Office. 
Finseraas, H. (2009) 'Income Inequality and Demand for Redistribution: A Multilevel Analysis of 
European Public Opinion', Scandinavian Political Studies 32(1): 94-119. 
Fischer, C. S., Stockmayer, G., Stiles, J., and Hout, M. (2004) 'Distinguishing the geographic levels and 
social dimensions of US metropolitan segregation, 1960–2000, ' Demography 41(1): 37-59.  
Hacker, J.S. and Pierson, P. (2011) Winner-take-all politics: How Washington made the rich richer - 
and turned its back on the middle class, New York, NY: Simon and Schuster. 
Iversen, T. and Soskice, D. (2006) 'Electoral institutions and the politics of coalitions: Why some 
democracies redistribute more than others', American Political Science Review 100(02): 165-
181. 
Jensen, C. (2012) 'Labour market- versus life course-related social policies: understanding cross-
programme differences', Journal of European Public Policy 19(2): 275-291. 
Jæger, M.M. (2006) 'What makes people support public responsibility for welfare provision: Self-
interest or political ideology? A longitudinal approach', Acta Sociologica 49(3): 321-338. 
Jæger, M.M. (2013) 'The effect of macroeconomic and social conditions on the demand for 
redistribution: A pseudo panel approach', Journal of European Social Policy 23(2): 149-163. 
23 
 
Kelly, N.J. and Enns, P.K. (2010) 'Inequality and the Dynamics of Public Opinion: The Self-
Reinforcing Link Between Economic Inequality and Mass Preferences', American Journal of 
Political Science 54(4): 855-870. 
Kenworthy, L. and McCall, L. (2008) 'Inequality, public opinion and redistribution', Socio-Economic 
Review 6(1): 35-68. 
Kenworthy, L. and Pontusson, J. (2005) 'Rising Inequality and the Politics of Redistribution in Affluent 
Countries', Perspectives on Politics 3(3): 449-471. 
Kumlin, S., and Svallfors, S. (2007). 'Social stratification and political articulation: why attitudinal 
class differences vary across countries'. In S. Mau and B. Veghte (eds.), Social justice, 
legitimacy and the welfare state. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate: 19-46. 
Lübker, M. (2007) 'Inequality and the demand for redistribution: are the assumptions of the new growth 
theory valid?', Socio-Economic Review 5(1): 117-148. 
Lupu, N. and Pontusson, J. (2011) 'The Structure of Inequality and the Politics of Redistribution', 
American Political Science Review 105(2): 316-336. 
Luttig, M. (2013) 'The structure of inequality and Americans’ attitudes toward redistribution', Public 
Opinion Quarterly 77(3): 811-821. 
Matthijs, M. (2016) 'The Euro’s ‘Winner-Take-All’ Political Economy: Institutional Choices, Policy 
Drift, and Diverging Patterns of Inequality', Politics & Society Forthcoming. 
McCall, L. (2013) The undeserving rich: American beliefs about inequality, opportunity, and 
redistribution, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
McCall, L., and Chin, F. (2013) 'Does knowledge of inequality affect beliefs about inequality'. Paper 
presented at the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL.  
24 
 
Meltzer, A.H. and Richard, S.F. (1981) 'A Rational Theory of the Size of Government', The Journal of 
Political Economy 89(5): 914-927. 
Milanovic, B. (2000) 'The Median-Voter Hypothesis, Income Inequality, and Income Redistribution: 
An Empirical Test with the Required Data', European Journal of Political Economy 16(3): 367-
410. 
Moene, K.O. and Wallerstein, M. (2001) 'Inequality, Social Insurance, and Redistribution', The 
American Political Science Review 95(4): 859-874. 
Norton, M.I. and Ariely, D. (2011) 'Building a better America—One wealth quintile at a time', 
Perspectives on Psychological Science 6(1): 9-12. 
O'Brien, R. (2007) 'A Caution Regarding Rules of Thumb for Variance Inflation Factors ', Quality & 
Quantity 41(5): 673-690. 
Page, B.I., Bartels, L.M. and Seawright, J. (2013) 'Democracy and the policy preferences of wealthy 
Americans', Perspectives on Politics 11(01): 51-73. 
Rehm, P., Hacker, J. S., and Schlesinger, M. (2012) 'Insecure alliances: Risk, inequality, and support 
for the welfare state', American Political Science Review 106(02): 386-406.  
Rodriguez, F. (2004). 'Inequality, redistribution, and rent-seeking', Economics & Politics 16(3): 287-
320. 
Romer, T. (1975) 'Individual welfare, majority voting, and the properties of a linear income tax', 
Journal of Public Economics 4(2): 163-185.  
Rueda, D. and Stegmueller, D. (2016) 'The externalities of inequality: Fear of crime and preferences for 
redistribution in Western Europe', American Journal of Political Science 60(2): 474-489. 
Schmidt-Catran, A.W. (2016) 'Economic inequality and public demand for redistribution: combining 
cross-sectional and longitudinal evidence', Socio-Economic Review 14(1): 119-140. 
25 
 
Schmidt-Catran, A.W. and Fairbrother, M. (2016) 'The Random Effects in Multilevel Models: Getting 
Them Wrong and Getting Them Right', European Sociological Review 32(1): 23-38. 
Shapiro, I. (2002) 'Why the Poor don't Soak the Rich', Daedalus 131(1): 118-128. 
Soroka, S. N., and Wlezien, C. (2010) Degrees of Democracy: Politics, Public Opinion, and Policy. 
New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 
Soroka, S. N., Johnston, R., Kevins, A., Banting, K., and Kymlicka, W. (2016) 'Migration and welfare 
state spending', European Political Science Review 8(2): 174-193.  
Steele, L.G. (2015) 'Income Inequality, Equal Opportunity, and Attitudes About Redistribution', Social 
Science Quarterly 96(2): 444-464. 
Svallfors, S. (2006). The moral economy of class: Class and attitudes in comparative perspective. 
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
Tepe, M. and Vanhuysse, P. (2009) 'Are Aging OECD Welfare States on the Path to Gerontocracy?', 
Journal of Public Policy 29(01): 1-28. 
Tóth, I.G. and Keller, T. (2014) 'Income Distribution, Inequality Perceptions, and Redistributive 
Preferences in European', in: Gornick J and Jäntti M (eds) Income Inequality: Economic 
Disparities and the Middle Class in Affluent Countries. Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 173-203. 
Trump, K.-S. (2017) 'Income Inequality Influences Perceptions of Legitimate Income Differences', 
British Journal of Political Science (Early Access): 1-24. 
 
26 
 
Figure 1. Mean attitudes towards redistribution and the Gini coefficient 
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Figure 2. Average Marginal Effects of 80:50 Ratio with 95% CIs 
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Table 1. Median-income voter Redistributive Preferences and 80:50 Inequality Ratios   
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Income (Ref:  
 
5th decile) 
 
 
     
1st decile  0.008* 0.190** 0.190** 0.241* 
  (0.004) (0.059) (0.059) (0.096) 
2nd decile  0.019*** 0.214*** 0.214*** 0.235** 
  (0.003) (0.055) (0.055) (0.078) 
3rd decile  0.015*** 0.152** 0.152** 0.174** 
  (0.003) (0.054) (0.054) (0.066) 
4th decile  0.010** 0.103+ 0.103+ 0.116* 
 
 
 (0.003) (0.054) (0.054) (0.057) 
6th decile  -0.009** -0.029 -0.028 -0.051 
  (0.003) (0.055) (0.055) (0.058) 
7th decile  -0.018*** 0.012 0.012 -0.039 
  (0.003) (0.056) (0.056) (0.067) 
8th decile  -0.032*** 0.029 0.029 -0.060 
  (0.003) (0.057) (0.057) (0.080) 
9th decile  -0.051*** 0.036 0.036 -0.092 
  (0.003) (0.058) (0.058) (0.095) 
10th decile  -0.109*** 0.074 0.074 -0.118 
  (0.003) (0.057) (0.057) (0.111) 
Good health (dummy)  -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.012*** 
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  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Left-right placement  -0.253*** -0.253*** -0.253*** -0.253*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Male (dummy)  -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.027*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Age   0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
  (0. 00005) (0. 00005) (0.00005) (0.00005) 
Education (Ref: < 
Lower secondary) 
     
Lower   0.012*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.00646* 
secondary  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Upper   0.006* 0.005+ 0.005+ 0.0004 
secondary  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Post-secondary   0.0008 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.004 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Tertiary   -0.037*** -0.037*** -0.037*** -0.041*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Employment status (Ref: 
Not in labour market) 
     
Employed  0.005** 0.006** 0.006** 0.005** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Unemployed  0.024*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.025*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
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Wave (Ref: 2008)      
2010  0.004 0.003 0.002 0.006 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
2012  0.019* 0.017* 0.022* 0.023** 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) 
2014  0.016+ 0.013 0.021* 0.018+ 
  (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) 
80:50 ratio   0.329** 0.267* 0.249* 
   (0.116) (0.117) (0.115) 
Income*Inequality 
 (Ref: 5th decile) 
     
1st decile*80:50   -0.123** -0.124** -0.159* 
   (0.040) (0.040) (0.065) 
2nd decile*80:50   -0.132*** -0.132*** -0.148** 
   (0.037) (0.037) (0.053) 
3rd decile*80:50   -0.093* -0.093* -0.109* 
   (0.037) (0.037) (0.044) 
4th decile*80:50   -0.063+ -0.063+ -0.072+ 
   (0.036) (0.036) (0.038) 
6th decile*80:50   0.014 0.014 0.029 
   (0.037) (0.037) (0.039) 
7th decile*80:50   -0.020 -0.020 0.015 
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   (0.038) (0.038) (0.046) 
8th decile*80:50   -0.042 -0.042 0.020 
   (0.038) (0.038) (0.054) 
9th decile*80:50   -0.059 -0.059 0.028 
   (0.039) (0.039) (0.064) 
10th decile*80:50   -0.125** -0.125** 0.006 
   (0.039) (0.039) (0.075) 
Centred GDP    -0.020+ -0.018+ 
    (0.012) (0.011) 
Constant 0.718*** 0.830*** 0.346* 0.442* 0.471** 
 (0.017) (0.016) (0.172) (0.174) (0.171) 
Variances      
Decile     .056*** 
     (.019) 
Country 0.076*** 0.068*** 0.063*** 0.056*** 0.050*** 
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) 
Country-year 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.024*** 0.025*** 0.020*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Residual 0.253*** 0.241*** 0.241*** 0.241*** 0.241*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)   (0.001) 
Level-3 Variance     0.005*** 
(Decile)     (0.001) 
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Level-3 Covariance     -0.059 
(Cons. Decile)     (0.249) 
Level-2 Variance     0.004*** 
(Decile)     (0.001) 
Level-2 Covariance     -0.142 
(Cons. Decile)     (0.206) 
# of Respondents  106003 106003 106003 106003 106003 
# of Country-years 76 76 76 76 76 
# of Countries 22 22 22 22 22 
Source: ESS; OECD; and Eurostat. Note: Cells contain maximum likelihood regression coefficients (with standard errors 
italicised in parentheses). Coefficients that reach (p < .05) significance are bolded.  + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 
0.001. 
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Appendix  
Appendix Table 1: Countries in regression analysis, with number of observations and included waves.8 
Country Year 
 2008 2010 2012 2014 Total 
      
AT  1313 1369 1236 3918 
BE 1493 1413 1646 1547 6099 
CH 1309 1169 1178  3656 
CZ 1307 1563 1255 1375 5500 
DE 2126 2255 2424 2609 9414 
DK 1338 1306 1353 1274 5271 
EE 1117 1288 1623  4028 
ES 1362 1339 1453 1314 5468 
FI 1926 1645 1968 1876 7415 
FR 1789 1520 1700 1700 6709 
GB 1802 1580 1485 1679 6546 
GR 1024 1371   2395 
HU 946 1069 1226 1032 4273 
IE 1428 1516 1650 1540 6134 
IS   605  605 
IT   509  509 
NL 1519 1414 1514 1626 6073 
NO 1455 1442 1537 1334 5768 
PL 1117 1151 1286 999 4553 
PT 710  749 950 2409 
SE 1667 1336 1598 1576 6177 
SI 828 775 693 787 3083 
      
Total 26263 26465 28821 24454 106003 
 
 
 
 
                                               
8  Note that Austrian data from the fourth (2008) and fifth (2010) waves of the ESS have been coded as years 2010 and 2012 
respectively. We do so due to the substantial, 2-3 year fieldwork delay in the fielding of each of these surveys. 
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Appendix Table 2: Descriptive statistics of all variables. (Note that there are 106003 obs. for each var.) 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Preference for Redistribution  0.704 (0.264) 0 1 
Income Decile 5.446 (2.755) 1 10 
Good Health (dummy) 0.679 (0.467) 0 1 
Left-Right Self-Placement 0.508 (0.215) 0 1 
Male (dummy) 0.491 (0.500) 0 1 
Age 49.164 (17.841) 14 123 
Education 3.285 (1.334) 1 5 
Employed (dummy) 0.524 (0.499) 0 1 
Unemployed (dummy) 0.041 (0.198) 0 1 
ESS Round 5.486 (1.098) 4 7 
80:50 Ratio 1.472 (0.087) 1.335 1.688 
Centred GDP 0.490 (1.006) -1.594 3.237 
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Appendix Figure 1: Cluster-robust standard errors 
 
Appendix Figure 2: Remove-one jackknife  
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